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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to identify the 'best practice' statutory 
provision for complicity and common purpose in Australia. The chosen 
vehicle for analysis is the Criminal Code 1983 (NT). The Northern 
Territory Government's decision to incorporate Chapter 2 of the Criminal 
Code 1995 (Cth), as Part IIAA of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT),l affords 
a comparison between the new s 43BG and the old s 8, which contains a 
subjective focus on foresight and the reversal of the onus of proof. This 
means that two separate but mutually exclusive provisions operate side by 
side, depending on whether the particular offence is in Schedule I or not. 2 
Such a comparison also provides a timely opportunity to contrast both 
provisions in the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) with the equivalent sections 
in the Griffith Codes. This article is a defence of the original reverse onus 
of proof provisions for common purpose contained in ss 8 to 10 of the 
Criminal Code 1983 (NT), which is justified on public policy grounds as 
the law is particularly concerned with criminal groups. The contrary 
* Lecturer in Law, University of Southern Queensland. 
1 Criminal Code Amendment (Criminal Responsibility Reform) Act 2005 (NT). The 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT), like the Northern Territory, has adopted Chapter 2 of 
the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). Section 7 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) which deals 
with the application of Chapter 2 states: 'This chapter applies to all offences against this 
Act and all other offences against territory laws.' However, s 7 is qualified by s 8 'Delayed 
application of ch 2 to certain offences'. Section 8(1) states: 'Despite section 7, the 
provisions of this chapter (other than applied provisions) do not apply to pre-2003 offences 
unless - (a) the offence is omitted and remade (with or without changes); or (b) an Act or 
subordinate law expressly provides for the provision to apply to the offence.' Section 8(5) 
provides that 'this section expires on the default application date' which s 10(1) defines as 
meaning I July 2013 or another date as prescribed by regulation. 
2 Under s 43AA(2) of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT), s 8 (Offences committed in 
prosecution of common purpose), s 9 (Mode of execution different from that counselled), 
and s 12 (Abettors and accessories before the fact) do not apply to Schedule 1 offences, 
which schedule presently only contains offences against the person, although it should be 
noted that other offences against the person such as s 181 'Serious hann' and s 186 'Hann' 
have still to be brought into Schedule 1. Instead, Schedule 1 offences come under Part 
llAA. For present purposes, the focus is upon s 11.2 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) 
which has become s 43BG of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT). Thus, for criminal 
responsibility for complicity and common purpose in relation to murder, a Schedule I 
offence, the relevant provision is now s 43BG in Part llAA. 
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arguments, including that such a position is an overreach of criminal 
liability, are clearly addressed. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In searching for. a model code provision for complicity and common 
purpose in Australia, there are four main choices: the common law; the 
Griffith Codes; the Model Criminal Code; and the original provisions of 
the Criminal Code 1983 (NT). Only the Griffith Codes adopt an objective 
test, and only the original provisions contained in ss 8 to 10 of the 
Criminal Code 1983 (NT) reverse the onus of proof. The Criminal Code 
1983 (NT) has been chosen as the vehicle for this analysis because it is 
presently in a hybrid transitional state while Chapter 2 of the Criminal 
Code 1995 (Cth), the progeny of the Model Criminal Code, is 
progressively applied to all offences. Thus, the original provisions can be 
directly compared with the treatment of complicity and common purpose 
in the Model Criminal Code. 
This article takes the law's concern over criminal groups, whether 
comprising violent gangs or criminal organisations, as a touchstone for 
the criterion of a model code provision for complicity and common 
purpose. Measured against such a touchstone, this article argues for the 
toughest provisions to deal with criminal groups, which are contained in 
ss 8 to 10 of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) via a subjective focus on 
foresight and the reversal of the onus of proof. The objective provisions 
of the Griffith Codes are rejected as outmoded and rooted in the 
nineteenth century with an underlying fault element of negligence. Both 
the Griffith Codes and the Model Criminal Code fail to adequately 
address 'recklessness'. On the one hand, the Griffith Codes do not deal 
with 'recklessness' at all, while on the other hand this article takes the 
view that the Model Criminal Code's provisions are restricted because of 
its defmition of 'recklessness'. Consistent with such an approach, the 
treatment of withdrawal is considered to be too weak in both the Griffith 
Codes and the Model Criminal Code. As such, stricter common law 
principles are specifically incorporated in a suggested revision of the 
provisions, which it is hoped will serve as a template for other Code 
jurisdictions in Australia. 
The law surrounding criminal responsibility and other parties to offences 
has historically evidenced both complexity and controversy. The terms 
'complicity', 'common purpose' and 'acting in concert' have caused the 
courts and law reform bodies3 some difficulty, and case law in this area of 
3 See for example Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, Complicity, 
Consultation Paper No 2 (2008). 
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the law has also been the subject of extensive academic critique.4 As the 
High Court has acknowledged '[t]hose tenus - common purpose, 
common design, concert, joint criminal enterprise - are used more or 
less interchangeably to invoke the doctrine which provides a means, often 
an additional means, of establishing the complicity of a secondary party 
in the commission of a crime'. 5 The reference to 'an additional means' 
recognises that liability can attach beyond accessory before the fact (aids, 
abets, counsels or procures) and principal in the second degree (present at 
the scene and aids or abets). The High Court defmed a common purpose 
as arising 'where a person reaches an understanding or arrangement 
amounting to an agreement between that person and another or others that 
they will commit a crime,.6 This need not be express, can be inferred 
from all the circumstances, and encompasses 'any other crime falling 
within the scope of the common purpose which is committed in carrying 
out that purpose' .7 
The law as stated above is consistent with the High Court's decision in 
lohns v The Queen.8 However, in McAuliffe v The Queen, the High Court 
was required 'to turn its attention to the situation where one party 
foresees, but does not agree to, a crime other than that which is planned, 
and continues to participate in the venture,.9 The High Court followed lO 
Lord Lane CJ in R v Hyde ll who was in turn enunciating the principle 
identified by Sir Robin Cooke in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen: 12 
If B realises (without agreeing to such conduct being used) that A may 
kill or intentionally inflict serious injury, but nevertheless continues to 
participate with A in the venture, that will amount to a sufficient mental 
element for B to be guilty of murder if A, with the requisite intent, kills in 
4 C Cato, 'Foresight of Murder and Complicity in Unlawful Joint Enterprises Where Death 
Results' (1990) 2 Bond Law Review 182, where the author argues that the test should be 
based upon foresight of probable consequences and not possible consequences; S Bronitt, 
'Defending Giorgianni - Part One: The Fault Required for Complicity' (1993) 17 Criminal 
Law Journal 242 argues for a restrictive fault element for common purpose based on intent 
in excluding both knowledge and recklessness; S Odgers, 'Criminal Cases in the High 
Court of Australia: McAuliffe and McAuliffe' (1996) 20 Criminal Law Journal 43 suggests 
that the High Court has introduced a new doctrine of 'reckless accessoryship' akin to a new 
felony murder rule for accessories; S Gray, 'I Didn't Know, 1 Wasn't There: Common 
purpose and the Liability of Accessories to Crime' (1999) 23 Criminal Law Journal 201 
argues for the abolition of the doctrine of common purpose in suggesting that this would 
simplify the law without altering the balance between the Crown and the defendant. 
5 McAuliffe v R (1995) 183 CLR 108, 113 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and 
Gummow JJ). 
6lbid 114. 
7lbid. 
s (1980) 143 CLR 108. 
9 McAuliffe v R (1995) 183 CLR 108, 115 (Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and 
Gummow JJ). 
10 Ibid. 
11 (1991) 1 QB 134. 
12 (1985) AC 168, 175. 
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the course of the venture. As Professor Smith points out, l3 B has in those 
circumstances lent himself to the enterprise and by so doing he has given 
assistance and encouragement to A in carrying out an enterprise which B 
realises may involve murder.14 
In GiZZard v The Queen,15 the High Court confmned the above principle 
in McAuliffe, with Hayne J summing up common purpose as requiring 
'consideration of what an accused foresaw, not just what the accused 
agreed would be done' .16 Criminal responsibility flows from continued 
participation 'despite having foreseen the possibility of events tumin~ out 
as in fact they did,.17 Three years later, in Clayton v The Queen,1 the 
High Court declined to reopen its earlier decisions in McAuliffe and 
GiZZard on the law relating to extended common purpose. Six members of 
the High Court restated the principle of foresight of the possibility of a 
murderous assault as follows: 
If a party to a joint criminal enterprise [interchangeably referred to as 
'acting in concert'] foresees the possibility that another might be assaulted 
with intention to kill or cause really serious injury to that person, and, 
despite that foresight, continues to participate in the venture, the criminal 
culpability lies in the continued participation in the joint enterprise with 
the necessary foresight. 19 
13 J C Smith, 'Commentary on Regina v Wakely' (1990) Criminal Law Review 119, 120-
121. 
14 Regina v Hyde (1991) 1 QB l34, l39 (Lord Lane CJ). 
15 (2003) 219 CLR 1. Gillard drove a man named Preston, in a van Gillard had stolen, to a 
car repair workshop where Preston shot dead two men while Gillard waited in the van. 
Gillard drove Preston away and later destroyed the van. Both Preston and Gillard were 
convicted of murder. The High Court allowed Gillard's appeal in holding that the trial 
judge should have allowed a case of manslaughter to go to the jury, on the basis that 
manslaughter was open if Gillard foresaw that Preston might shoot the two men during a 
robbery but without foreseeing intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. The High 
Court held that it was not possible to say that despite the trial judge's error there was no 
miscarriage of justice. 
16 !bid 38. As all Australian States retain a constructive or felony murder rule, if Preston 
had been charged with felony murder rather than murder, then arguably all Gillard would 
have needed to foresee would have been the trigger offence of the armed robbery. Gillard's 
defence was that he believed he was involved in an unarmed robbery. It may be objected 
that it is unfair to an accessory like Gillard to arrive at a murder conviction via the double 
reach of the felony murder rule in combination with the extended common purpose rule. 
However, felony murder remains on the statute books for policy reasons and 'reflects a 
societal judgment that an intentionally committed robbery that causes the death of a human 
being is qualitatively more serious than an identical robbery that does not'. D Crump and S 
W Crump, 'In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine' (1985) 8(2) Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy 359,363. 
17 Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1, 38. 
18 (2006) 81 ALJR 439. In Clayton, three people were convicted of murder when they 
armed themselves with metal poles, wooden poles and a carving knife and went to a house 
where the victim was subjected to a prolonged attack during which he was severely beaten 
and stabbed numerous times, with one of the stab wounds proving fatal. 
19 !bid 443 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 
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In 1992, the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee (MCCOC) 
produced its Final Report on General Principles of Criminal 
Responsibility.2o Inter alia, the MCCOC attempted to clarify and reform 
the law of complicity, but in the end left the fundamentals intact such as 
retaining the dual distinction between accessory before the fact and 
common purpose?l However, the MCCOC report, and subsequently the 
Criminal Code (Cth), were silent in terms of 'acting in concert' liability 
and this did not form part of the scheme of complicity liability until the 
insertion of s 11.2A 'Joint Commission' into the Criminal Code (Cth) in 
201022 rectified the absence of 'acting in concert' to deal with organised 
crime. 23 
The doctrine of 'acting in concert' requires the parties to be present, 
unlike the doctrine of common purpose, although both doctrines may 
overlap depending on the factual matrix which may then in turn create 
complex jury directions.24 Arguably, in Os land v The Queen,25 the High 
Court recognised 'acting in concert' as a new primary form of joint 
liability. McHugh J stated that under this category 'the liability of each 
person present as a result of the concert is not derivative but primary' 
(principal in the fust degree) such that 'each of the persons acting in 
concert is equally responsible for the acts of the other or others'. 26 
McHugh J cited R v Lowery and King (No 2),27 Tangye,28 and an 
academic text29 as authority. McHugh J observed that the correct 
20 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee (MCCOC), General Principles of Criminal 
Responsibility, Final Report (1992). 
21 Ibid 88-93. The MCCOC had proposed to abolish the common purpose rule in the 
Discussion Draft but, at 91: '[w]ith the abolition of recklessness generally from complicity, 
it was decided to restore common purpose in a modified form based on the general test of 
recklessness used in the Code' . 
22 Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Act 2010 (Cth). Section 
11.2A 'Joint Commission' deals with parties who enter into an agreement (which may 
consist of a non-verbal understanding) to commit an offence, and covers offences 
committed in accordance with the agreement (of the same type) and in the course of 
carrying out the agreement (a person is reckless about the commission of the joint offence 
that another party in fact commits in the course of carrying out the agreement). 
23. Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 June 2009, 6967 
(Robert McClelland, Attorney-General). 
24 Justice Geoff Eames, 'Tackling the Complexity of Criminal Trial Directions: What Role 
for Appellate Courts?' (2007) 29 Australian Bar Review 161. See also R v Taufahema 
(2007) 228 CLR 232. The facts were that four men on parole went for a ride together in a 
stolen car each armed with a loaded stolen revolver. The car was speeding and was pursued 
by a highway patrol car but collided with an obstacle. All four men leapt from the car and 
one of them (not Taufahema) shot at the windscreen of the patrol car killing the policeman 
inside. The trial highlighted the complexity of administering a criminal trial and of 
explaining the law of complicity. 
25 (1998) 197 CLR 316. 
26 Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316,342. 
27 [1972] VR 560, 560 (Smith J). 
28 (1997) 92 A Crim R 545, 556--557 (Hunt CJ at CL). 
29 P Brett, P L Waller and C R Williams, Criminal Law (Butterworths, 1997) 465. 
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principle 'is that they are all equally liable for the acts that constitute the 
actus reus of the crime' 30 and is accurately stated by Brett, Waller and 
Williams as follows: 31 
[E]ven if only one participant perfonned the acts constituting the crime, 
each will be guilty as principals in the first degree if the acts were 
perfonned in the presence of all and pursuant to a ~reconceived plan. In 
this case, the parties are said to be acting in concert.3-
Osland was decided in 1998, yet it took a further 12 years and the 
increasing prominence of organised crime to prompt the insertion of s 
11.2A Joint Commission into the Criminal Code (Cth) in 2010. Certainly, 
the recognition by the High Court of 'acting in concert' complicated the 
existing law dealing with complicity and common purpose. A further 
complication emerges when it is understood that cases like Giorgianni v 
R33 are in conflict with 'a line of cases34 which on true analysis, impose 
secondary liability on the basis of something like recklessness' .35 In light 
of the various forms of derivative and primary liability constituted by 
criminal complicity, this article seeks to identify the most appropriate 
statutory provision to cover criminal complicity. 
IT THE ORIGINAL STAlE OF THE LAW OF COMPLICITY AND 
C0:tvllv10N PURPOSE IN THE NORTIIERN TERRITORY 
A Common Purpose 
Part 1 of the Criminal Code (NT) is entitled 'Introductory Matters' and 
Division 2 is captioned 'Presumptions' which includes s 8 dealing with 
the presumption for offences committed in prosecution of common 
purpose. For common purpose, s 8 contains a rebuttable presumption that 
each of the parties aided or procured the perpetrator to commit the 
offence unless he or she could prove on the balance of probabilities lack 
of foresight that the commission of the offence was a possible 
30 Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316, 343. 
31 Brett, Waller and Williams, above n 29. 
32 Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316,343 (emphasis in original). 
33 (1985) 156 CLR 473. This case concerned a truck with defective brakes which was 
involved in a fatal accident when the brakes failed. The owner of the truck, Giorgianni, was 
not present at the time of the accident. The High Court held that, on a charge of culpable 
driving, Giorgianni could be held liable only if he knew that the driver was going to 
commit an offence and he intended to assist. Recklessness was insufficient and knowledge 
meant actual knowledge. 
34 lohns v The Queen (1980) 143 CLR 108; Miller v The Queen (1980) 32 ALR 321; 
McAuliffe and McAuliffe v R (1995) 183 CLR 108; Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 
1. 
35 D Lanham, B Bartal, R Evans and D Wood, Criminal Laws in Australia (Federation 
Press, 2006) 500. 'The language is that of common purpose but in reality it is foresight 
rather than purpose which is being punished' citing Gray, 'I Don't Know, I Wasn't There' 
above n 4, 201. 
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consequence.36 Once the Crown is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt 
the common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose, a reversal of the 
onus of proof operates under a subjective test of foresight. 
8 Offences committed in prosecution of common purpose 
(1) When 2 or more persons fonn a common intention to prosecute an 
unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another and in the prosecution 
of such purpose an offence is committed by one or some of them, the 
other or each of the others is presumed to have aided or procured the 
perpetrator or perpetrators of the offence to commit the offence unless he 
proves he did not foresee the commission of that offence was a possible 
consequence of prosecuting that unlawful purpose. (Emphasis added.) 
(2) Two or more persons fonn a common intention to prosecute an 
unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another when they agree to 
engage in or concur in engaging in any conduct that, if engaged in, would 
involve them or some or one of them in the commission of an offence or a 
tort. 
Thus, for example, under s 8 above the 'accessories in McAulifje37 would 
need to prove that they did not foresee murder as a possible consequence 
of their plan to "roll" or "bash" someone'. 38 This is a subjective test of 
foresight. There is a legal onus of proof being placed on the accused on 
the balance of probabilities, not a mere evidential onus as a reasonable 
possibility. 
Similarly, Gillard would have to have proved that he did not foresee 
Preston's intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm as a possible 
consequence during an armed robbery, when both men were disguised 
and Gillard made a telephone call to establish the key victim was at the 
workshop. Again, Clayton would have to have proved that he did not 
foresee murder as a possible consequence during a prolonged attack, in 
which he was a participant, when the victim was stabbed numerous times. 
Finally, Taufahema would need to prove that he did not foresee murder as 
a possible consequence, when four armed men on parole carrying 
unlicensed fIrearms in a stolen car travelling at excessive speed were 
36 Similar rebuttable presumptions are contained in s 9 'Mode of execution different from 
that counselled' and s 10 'Death or serious harm caused in the course of violence of 2 or 
more persons'. Section 9 is similar in form to s 9 of the Griffith Codes. Section 10, which 
has no counterpart in the Griffith Codes, is constructed to avoid each defendant being 
acquitted because of the Crown's inability to prove which defendant actually struck the 
final fatal blow. However, unlike ss 8 and 9, s 10 does apply to Schedule I offences. 
Section 10 is not included in s 43AA(2) which contains a list of provisions of Part 1 which 
do not apply in relation to Schedule 1 offences, such as s 43AA(2)(f) excluding s 8 and s 
43AA(2)(g) excluding s 9. The non-inclusion of s 10 to Schedule 1 offences would appear 
to be necessary given that sub-s (7) of 11.2 'Complicity and common purpose' of the 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) does not appear in s 43BG of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT). 
37 (1995) 183 CLR 108. 
38 S Gray, Criminal Laws: Northern Territory (Federation Press, 2004) 158-159. 
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chased by a police patrol car and caught when the stolen car hit a gutter 
and stopped. 
The uniqueness of s 8 above needs to be emphasised. Arguably, s 8 
represents a halfway house between the purely objective approaches to 
fault liability for common purpose in the Griffith Codes of Queensland 
and Western Australia, and the subjective approaches of common law 
jurisdictions such as New South Wales represented by the line of High 
Court cases since McAuliffe. Lanham et al argue that '[t]he Northern 
Territory provision is close to the common law in basing liability on 
foresight of possibility but it extends the common purpose to torts and 
inverts the burden of proof' .39 It is unfortunate that the New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission appears to have overlooked s 8 Criminal Code 
(NT) in summarising the reform options available. 40 
Bronitt and McSherry also state that common purpose in s 8(1) 'follows 
the common law approach,41 which the learned authors describe as 'a 
distinct form of extended secondary liability,42 where accessorialliability 
is imposed for offences that either fall within the scope of the original 
criminal agreement or fall outside that scope but are foreseen as a 
possible consequence.43 Thus, the doctrine of common purpose applies to 
two different situations.44 However, as Clough and Mulhem note, s 8(1) 
differs from the common law because 'the onus of proving lack of 
foresight is on the accused,45 which follows from the wording of the onus 
of proof expressed in s 8(1). 
What is the rationale for a reversal of the onus of proof and what 
justification is there for the State placing a legal burden of proof on the 
defendant? The lurking spectre of Woolmington v DPp46 and the lustre of 
the famous golden thread speech of Viscount Sankey inevitably appears 
whenever the onus of proof is raised. ill this context, it should be recalled 
that Viscount Sankey qualified 'one golden thread' as 'subject also to any 
• , 47 
statutory exceptIOn . 
39 Lanham et al, above n 35,502. 
40 Law Refonn Commission of New South Wales, above n 3, [6.13]. 
41 S Bronitt and B McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (Lawbook, 2nd revised ed, 2005) 
380. 
42 Ibid. 
43 For extended common purpose the requisite degree of contemplation is 'an act 
contemplated as a possible incident of the originally planned venture': R v Johns [1978] 1 
NSWLR 282, 290 (Street Cn, affmned in Johns v R (1980) 143 CLR 108, 130-131 
(Mason, Murphy and Wilson JJ). 
44 Osland v R (1998) 197 CLR 316,327 (Gaudron and Gummow JJ). 
45 J Clough and C Mulhern, Criminal Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2004) [11.64]. 
46 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462. 
47 Ibid 481. 
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However, as has been pointed out in A Guide to Framing Commonwealth 
Offences, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers,48 the Senate Scrutiny 
of Bills Committee 'usually comments adversely on a bill which places 
the onus on an accused person to disprove one or more of the elements of 
the offence with which he or she is charged' .49 Significantly, for the 
purposes of this article, whilst the matter being within the defendant's 
knowledge has not been considered sufficient justification, the Senate 
Committee 'is most inclined to support reversal where the defence 
consists of pointing to the defendant's state of belief' .50 Given that 
foresight is at the heart of extended common purpose, the Committee's 
view appears to be promising. 
Nevertheless, there are problems using reverse onus provisions in 
jurisdictions with human rights legislation such as Victoria,51 as the 
recent case of R v Momcilovic52 amply demonstrates. Prohibited drugs 
were found in the applicant's apartment. Section 5 of the Drugs, Poisons 
and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic) imposed on a defendant the 
legal burden of disproving possession on the balance of probabilities. 
However, under s 25(1) of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights, 'a 
person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty according to law'. The Victorian Court of 
Appeal held that's 5 cannot be interpreted consistently with s 25(1) of the 
Charter, although this does not affect the validity of s 5,.53 The Court of 
Appeal issued a declaration of inconsistent interpretation under s 36(2) of 
the Charter, and the matter is now under review by the Victorian 
Government. 
Notwithstanding the Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee and human 
rights legislation, the case for a reverse onus of proof for common 
purpose rests on public policy grounds. The Law Commission of England 
and Wales in its 2007 report Participating in Crime54 gave its reasons for 
retaining the doctrine of extended common purpose under the 'Chan 
Wing-Sui principle' ,55 which have been usefully summarised by the New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission in its own 2008 report.56 This 
article contends that some of the reasons, which are rooted in public 
48 Attorney-General's Department (Cth) , A Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, 
Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers, Australian Government (December 2007). 
49 !bid 30. 
50 !bid 31. 
51 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vie). See also the Human 
Rights Act 2004 (ACT). 
52 [2010] VSCA 50 (17 March 2010) (Maxwell P, Ashley and Neave JJA). 
53 !bid [154]. 
54 Law Commission of England and Wales, Participating in Crime, Law Commission 
Report No 305 (2007) [3.140], [3.141], [3.142], [3.146], [3.147]. 
55 Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen (1985) AC 168. 
56 Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, above n 3, [6.11]. 
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policy, are equally valid in support of the reverse onus of proof for 
common purpose. 
Specifically, any joint criminal venture 'has the potential to escalate and 
involve the commission of more serious offences' .57 Furthermore, a 
participant with foresight of a range of possible offences 'should not be 
able to pick and choose which of these offences to be liable for, simply on 
the basis of his or her attitude towards their occurrence' .58 Then, there is 
always the opportunity for one of the participants to 'withdraw from the 
criminal venture by negating the effect of the original agreement'59 before 
the commission of the offence. 
Legislative support for a reversal of the onus of proof for incitement 
offences can be found in s 50 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (UK). Part 2 
of the Serious Crime Act (which came into force on 1 October 2008) 
replaced the common law inchoate offence of incitement with three new 
offences dealing with encouraging or assisting the commission of an 
offence (ss 44 to 46). Section 50 'Defence of acting reasonably' sets out 
that it will be a defence to the offences in Part 2 if the person proves 
(reverse onus) that he or she acted reasonably in the circumstances he or 
she was aware of or reasonably believed existed. Section 50(3) sets out 
factors (not exhaustive) to be considered by the court in determining 
whether an act was reasonable in the circumstances, such as the 
seriousness of the anticipated offence, and any purpose or authority for or 
by which the person claims to have been acting. 
It is acknowledged that casting the net of criminal liability for extended 
common purpose too wide may compromise the legitimacy of the 
criminal law in cases which implicate defendants for some of the most 
serious offences. Kirby J is a prominent critic of the current test of 
extended common liability in homicide cases, describing the test as the 
'overreach of criminal liability' .60 However, for homicide, given that the 
prosecution is rarely in a position to contest the version of events given 
by the defendant(s), as often the only other witness has been killed by the 
defendant(s), this is a strong justification for reversing the onus of proof 
under extended common purpose. It is true that the prosecution has the 
ability to present evidence to contest the defendant's version of events, 
but this has to be tempered by judicial directions to the jury to decide the 
case on the facts most favourable to the defendant. Such an argument in 
support of a reverse onus was endorsed by the Queensland Law Reform 
Commission in relation to the partial defence of provocation, and recently 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Clayton v The Queen (2006) 81 AIJR 439, 461. 
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enacted by the Queensland Parliament.61 Furthermore, in a 1997 study it 
was found that 40 per cent of all homicides were perpetrated by more 
than one offender.62 
Applying a public confidence test in the legitimacy of the criminal law to 
the quartet of cases that went to the High Court previously discussed in 
this article, namely, MeA uliffe , GiZZard, Clayton, and Taujahema, given 
the facts in each case the only question is whether they should all have 
been convicted of murder (as opposed to one of the four being convicted 
of manslaughter).63 A reverse onus of proof would not only have made 
four murder convictions more likely, but also would have lessened the 
scope for appeals. Arguably, this is in keeping with public expectations 
when more than one person is knowingly involved in a violent crime. 
By contrast to a subjective test with a rebuttable presumption in s 8(1) 
Criminal Code (NT), under the Griffith Codes which 'depart from the 
common law slightly,64 the test is objective as to whether the offence was 
a probable consequence of the common intention to prosecute an 
unlawful purpose. Section 8 of the Criminal Code 1913 (WA) has been 
singled out below because unlike either its 'sister' Code in Queensland65 
or the Criminal Code (NT) it contains a specific section on withdrawal. It 
is apparent that s 8(2) (set out below) has three elements: (i) withdrawal; 
61 Queensland Law Reform Commission, 'A Review of the Excuse of Accident and the 
Defence of Provocation', Report No 64 (2008) [20.225], which recommendation has now 
become subsection (7) of s 304 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) which states: 'On a 
charge of murder, it is for the defence to prove that the person charged is, under this 
section, liable to be convicted of manslaughter only', following the successful passage of 
the Criminal Code and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2011 (Qld). 
62 C Carcach, 'Youth as Victims and Offenders of Homicide' (Trends and Issues in Crime 
and Justice, No 73, Australian Institute of Criminology, 1997) 4. 
63 Motekiai Taufahema at retrial pleaded gUilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to 11 
years imprisonment with eligibility for parole after 7 years. See R v Taufahema [2007] 
NSWSC 959 (31 August 2007) (Grove J). Gillard at retrial was found unfit to stand trial by 
reason of mental impairment. Under s 269MB Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), 
Nyland J found the objective facts of two murders proved and made a supervision order 
with a mandatory limiting term fixed of life. See R v Gillard [2008] SASC 38 (22 February 
2008) (Nyland J). 
64 Bronitt and McSherry, above n 41, 380. The authors suggest that the Griffith Codes 
'continue to apply the nineteenth century approach to fault, adopting an objective test in 
assessing whether the crime committed by the principal offender was a probable 
consequence of carrying out the common purpose'. As Goode has pointed out, 'the Griffith 
Codes did not, and do not, deal with the (for them) entirely novel idea of recklessness'. M 
R Goode, 'Constructing Criminal Law Reform and the Model Criminal Code' (2002) 26 
Criminal Law Journal 152, 159. Indeed, as Fairall has observed, '[i]n Queensland and 
Western Australia, courts have interpreted the Griffith Codes in such a way that negligence 
is the underlying fault standard'. P Fairall, Review of Aspects of the Criminal Code of the 
Northern Territory Report, Department of Justice (NT) (March 2004) 41, citing as 
authority Rv Taiters (1996) 87 A Crim R 507, 512. 
65 See s 8 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). See also s 4 Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) which adopts 
the objective test. 
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(ii) communication of the withdrawal to each person involved; and (ill) 
the taking of reasonable steps to prevent the commission of the offence. A 
fuller discussion of withdrawal is undertaken during a later examination 
of s 43BG(5) which also adopts the 'taking reasonable steps' approach as 
the test for withdrawal. 
8. Offences committed in prosecution of common purpose 
(1) When 2 or more persons fonn a common intention to prosecute an 
unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another, and in the prosecution 
of such purpose an offence is committed of such a nature that its 
commission was a probable consequence of the prosecution of such 
purpose, each of them is deemed'to have committed the offence. 
(2) A person is not deemed under subsection (1) to have committed the 
offence if, before the commission of the offence, the person 
(a) withdrew from the prosecution of the unlawful purpose; 
(b) by words or conduct, communicated the withdrawal to each 
other person with whom the common intention to prosecute the 
unlawful purpose was fonned; and 
(c) having so withdrawn, took all reasonable steps to prevent the 
commission of the offence. 
(Emphasis added.) 
As Kenny points out the probable consequence test in s 8(1) of the 
Criminal Code 1913 (W A) 'imports a remoteness test into the provision 
'" because of the objective nature of the test'. 66 As Gibbs J observed in 
Stuart the question is 'not whether the accused was aware that its 
commission was a probable consequence,67 but rather the test for 
probable consequence is 'that which a person of average competence and 
knowledge mi~ht be expected to foresee as likely to follow upon the 
particular act'. 8 
Recent High Court authority on the meaning of 'probable consequence' is 
contained in Darkan v the Queen69 where the majority (comprising 
Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ) found that the trial judge 
had 'failed to steer a course between saying that a probable consequence 
66 R G Kenny, An Introduction to Criminal Law in Queensland and Western Australia 
(Butterworths, 2008) 9.37. 
67 (1974) 134 CLR 426,442. 
68 Ibid. 
69 (2006) 227 CLR 373. Darkan and two other men had been recruited by the victim's 
former partner to give the victim 'a touch up' and to 'fix him up'. None of the men knew 
the victim. The victim was hit with a pickaxe handle and kicked repeatedly, with one of the 
men wearing steel-capped boots. The victim was crying for help. His body was found the 
next day with severe bruising, a broken jaw and facial lacerations. The cause of death was 
aspiration of blood due to severe facial trauma. One of the men gave evidence for the 
prosecution in return for receiving a reduced sentence. 
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was one which was more likely to occur than not ... and saying that a 
probable consequence was a real or substantial possibility or chance' .70 In 
seeking to clarify the law, the majority held that the expression 'probable 
consequence' means that 'the occurrence of the consequence need not be 
more probable than not, but must be probable as distinct from possible' .71 
In framing a correct jury direction under s 8 the majority concluded that 
the commission of the offence 'had to be not merely possible, but 
probable in the sense that it could well have happened in the prosecution 
of the unlawful purpose' .72 
Darkan was solely concerned with the interpretation of the two words 
'probable consequence'. The appellants argued that the trial judge should 
have said nothing about the meaning of a 'probable consequence,73 
relying on a statement by Sir Samuel Griffith that '[a] Code ought, if 
possible, to be so framed as to require no definitions of terms in common 
use in ordinary speech or writing' .74 The majority rejected this view 
stating that the meaning of a ',rsrobable consequence' is 'not relatively 
simple, but differs with context' 5 and that judges should not be precluded 
from answering juror questions about of the meaning of such 
• 76 
expressIOns. 
The test of 'probable consequence' was further considered by the High 
Court in R v Keenan.77 Keenan, in company with three other men, had 
confronted the victim, Coffey, who allegedly had failed to pass on $7,000 
collected for Keenan. One of the men, Booth, was carrying a small 
baseball bat. Another of the men, Spizzirri, allegedly produced a sawn-off 
gun and shot Coffey several times in the spine leaving him a paraplegic. 
There was no evidence that using a gun had been discussed beforehand. 
Keenan was convicted of doing grievous bodily harm with intent and 
appealed. 
The Court of Appeal acquitted Keenan holding that a jury, properly 
instructed, could not have excluded the inference that Spizzirri was acting 
independently of the common planned intention to the attack on Coffey. 
The Crown appealed to the High Court which unanimously allowed the 
appeal. The High Court held s 8 of the Criminal Code (Qld) required the 
jury to consider frrstly, what the common purpose was, and, then, 
70 Ibid 396-397. 
71lbid 398. 
72 Ibid. 
73lbid 393. 
74 Sir Samuel Griffith, 'An Explanatory Letter to the Honourable the Attorney-General', 
Draft of a Code of Criminal Law prepared for the Government of Queensland, (1897) viii. 
75 Darkan v The Queen (2006) 227 CLR 373,395. 
76lbid 394-395. 
77 R v Keenan (2009) 236 CLR 397. 
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secondly, 'whether the shooting was an offence of such a nature that its 
commission was a probable consequence of carrying out that purpose' .78 
Hayne J held that the Court of Appeal had misdirected itself by treating 
absence of evidence that Keenan knew that a gun had been taken to the 
scene as determinative, because focus on the weapon used was an 
incomplete description of the common purpose, which was alleged to be 
inflicting serious harm on the victim, Coffey. The second question posed 
by s 8, was the offence committed of such a nature that its commission 
was a probable consequence of the prosecution of the unlawful purpose, 
'can be answered in the affirmative even if the possibility that the conduct 
actually committed would occur was not shown to have been adverted to 
by any participant in the common intention' .79 
Hayne J pointed out that the formation of the common purpose 'may not 
have been accompanied by any consideration, let alone detailed 
consideration, of what was to be done, how it was to be done, and who 
was to do what to bring about the intended purpose', and cited Gibbs J in 
Stuart v The Queen80 in support. The test to be applied under s 8 was 
identified by Kiefel J as referring to 'the probable consequences of the 
common plan 1 not what the parties might have foreseen' .81 Thus, it 
matters not under such an objective test that the parties did not consider 
the possibility that the type of offence actually committed would be 
committed, or be aware that it was a probable consequence. 
Lanham et al state that s 8( 1) departs 'more radically from the current 
common law by making the indirect party liable for an offence committed 
by the direct party if that offence is an objectively probable consequence 
of the common unlawful purpose' .82 For this reason, the New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission suggests (and the author respectfully 
agrees) that this test 'is arguably harder to establish by a prosecution than 
78 Public Infonnation Officer, High Court of Australia, Judgment Summary: R v Francis 
Robert Keenan (2 February 2009). 
79 R v Keenan (2009) 236 CLR 397, 424 (Hayne J). 
80 (1974) 134 CLR 426,442 (Gibbs 1): 'in fact the nature ofthe offence [may be] such that 
its commission was a probable consequence of the prosecution of the common unlawful 
~urpose'. 
1 R v Keenan (2009) 236 CLR 397, 434. 
82 Lanham et al, above n 35, 502-503, citing inter alia Stuart v The Queen (1974) 134 CLR 
426 and R v Hind and Ha1wood (1995) 80 A Crim R 105. The learned authors observe at 
503 that: 'Probability is to be determined not by the abstract definition of the wrong which 
makes up the unlawful purpose but by the circumstances in which the wrong is committed 
. . . Probability by itself is not enough. The ultimate crime must be committed in 
prosecution of the common purpose.' Thus, in Rv Phillips [1967] Qd R 237, the common 
purpose was to assault the victim and the direct party committed robbery, therefore the 
robbery did not occur in the prosecution of the common purpose and consequently liability 
was not made out. In Phillips, external factors were considered in determining the scope of 
the common intention, with the court taking the perplexing view that robbery would not 
ordinarily occur in the common prosecution of an assault. 
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the "possibility" test' 83 at common law. 84 The rationale for supporting 
extended common purpose (or 'reckless accessoryship,)85 rather than 
limiting fault to intention based on knowledge has, with respect, been 
well expressed by Hayne J in GiZZard v The Queen: 
If liability is confined to offences for the commission of which the 
accused has previously agreed, an accused person will not be guilty of any 
form of homicide in a case where, despite foresight of the possibility of 
violence by a co-offender, the accused has not agreed to its use. That 
result is unacceptable. That is why the common law principles have 
developed as they have.86 
In summarising the above authority on the meaning of the words 
'probable consequence' in s 8 of Criminal Code (Qld) , extension of 
criminal responsibility is confmed to only such offences as are 
objectively the probable consequence of the common intention. Thus, 
foresight of the offence is immaterial; rather, the meaning of probability 
varies with the context and is to be contrasted with possibility. The focus 
in Darkan was on a meaning of a probability of less than 50-50 but must 
be probable as distinct from possible, which was refined in Keenan to 
refer to the probable consequences of the common plan as opposed to 
what the parties might have foreseen. 
The question then arises, in the search for the most appropriate statutory 
provision for common purpose, whether an objective test of 'probability' 
based on the ordinary person test as per s 8(1) Criminal Code rvv A) is to 
be preferred to a subjective test87 that the defendant did not foresee the 
commission of the offence as a possible consequence as per s 8(1) 
Criminal Code (NT). It is here contended that the intention of the 
wording of s 8(1) Criminal Code (NT), by specifying the reversal of 
proof against a possible consequence, was to raise the bar above the 
83 Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, above n 3, [6.13]. The Commission took 
this view because the probability test 'makes the secondary participant liable for the 
offence committed by the primary participant if that offence is an objectively probable 
. consequence of the common unlawful purpose' citing Lanham et al, above n 82. 
84 Interestingly, while at the original trial Keenan was convicted, Booth, who was carrying 
a small baseball bat, was found not guilty. The jury could not reach a verdict on Spizzirri, 
who was retried and found not guilty. See above n 78. 
85 See Odgers, 'Criminal Cases in the High Court of Australia: McAuliffe and McAuliffe', 
aboven4. 
86 Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1, 38. 
87 Bronitt and McSherry, above n 41, 380, note that the Gibbs Committee regarded the 
objective test in s 8(1) Criminal Code (WA) as 'outmoded and recommended the adoption 
of the current common law approach' citing Attorney General's Department (Cth), Review 
Committee of Commonwealth Criminal Law, Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law, 
Interim Report: Principles of Criminal Responsibility and Other Matters (1990) 205-206. 
The authors further observed that the MCCOC, General Principles of Criminal 
Responsibility, Final Report (1992) 89, 'similarly recommended a subjective rather than 
objective approach' . 
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common law (which is in turn above the objective test in the Griffith 
Codes) for defendants seeking to avoid being caught under common 
purpose. It follows that if a legislature detennines for policy reasons in 
the face of gang violence and organised crime to cast a wide net for 
common purpose (effectively a double bar jump over the objective test), 
then the use of 'possible' instead of 'probable' and the placing of a legal 
burden on the defendant on the balance of probabilities is the more 
effective option. 
B Complicity 
From its earliest days our criminal law has recognised that a person may 
be convicted of committing a crime that was in fact committed by 
someone else.88 
As with the amended Criminal Code (Cth) following the insertion of s 
11.2A, Part 1 of the Criminal Code (NT) has two distinct sections dealing 
with common purpose (s 8) and parties to offences (s 12 dealing with 
abettors and accessories before the fact). Accessorial liability arises 
where there is no agreement (as opposed to joint criminal enterprise) to 
commit a crime among participants.89 As previously mentioned, s 8 
operates such that once the Crown is able to prove beyond reasonable 
doubt the common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose, the 
defendant faces a rebuttable. presumption that he or she did not 
subjectively foresee the offence committed. Section 12 below overlaps90 
with s 8 but as opposed to a rebuttable presumption, adopts a deeming 
provision whereby aiders, counsellors or procurers to the offence are 
deemed to have taken part. Thus, for example, once the Crown proves a 
person's involvement in the offence under s 12(l)(a) below, which deals 
with a person aiding another in committing the offence, that person may 
be charged with actually committing the offence as this subsection 
'applies where the accessory is physically present during the commission 
of the offence' .91 
Clearly, the prosecution would favour charging a person under s 8 
because of the reverse onus of proof as opposed to utilising s 12. Herein 
is to be found a major limitation of s 43BG in the new Part IIAA, in that 
88 J Smith, 'Criminal Liability of Accessories: Law and Law Refonn' (1997) 113 Law 
Quarterly Review 453. The law of complicity has been stated to be suffering from 
'fundamental doctrinal obscurity': A Ashworth, 'General Principles of Criminal Law' in D 
Feldman (ed), English Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2004) [24.58]. 
89 A Simester and R Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Hart, 2003) 221. 
90 The doctrine of complicity has three categories: joint criminal enterprise, extended 
common purpose and accessorialliability. In practice there is considerable overlap between 
them. See D Brown, D Farrier, S Egger, L McNamara and A Steel, Brown, Farrier, Neal 
and Weisbrot's Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process 
in New South Wales (Federation Press, 4th ed, 2006) [11.4.1]. 
91 Gray, above n 38, 153. 
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combining complicity and common purpose in the one section limits the 
reach of the common purpose provision, and also acts to restrict statutory 
flexibility in terms of the deployment of rebuttable presumptions through 
the use of separate sections. The critical point here is that the scope of 
criminal responsibility of an accessory which falls to be decided under s 
12 is extended through the operation of sections 8, 9 and 10 Criminal 
Code (NT).92 
Division 3 Parties to Offences 
12 Abettors and accessories before the fact 
(1) When an offence is committed, the following persons also are deemed 
to have taken part in committing the offence and may be charged with 
actually committing it: 
(a) every person who aids another in committing the offence; 
(b) every person who does or omits to do any act for the purpose of 
enabling or aiding another to commit the offence; and 
(c) every person who counsels or procures another to commit the 
offence. 
(2) A person who counsels or procures another to commit an offence may 
be charged with committing the offence or counselling or procuring its 
commission. 
(3) A finding of guilt of counselling or procuring the commission of an 
offence entails the same consequences in all respects as a finding of gUilt 
of committing the offence. 
Section 12 above has its origins in s 7 Criminal Code (Qld) which is 
entitled 'Principal offenders' and also employs deeming provisions for 
accessories. Section 12 is solely focused on complicity and leaves 
common purpose to be covered by s 8, which follows the approach taken 
by the Griffith Codes, and differs from the Criminal Code (Cth) which 
combines complicity and common purpose into the one section, s 11.2. 
The structure of s 12, following the Griffith Codes,93 separates aiding 
from counsels and procures which reflects the traditional distinction of 
aiders being present during the commission of the offence, and 
counsellors and procurers being absent. 94 There is no reference to abettors 
which is only a marginal gain. Section 12(l)(b) 'covers a person who 
92 Kenny, above n 66, 181, for the same observation in relation to ss 7, 8 and 9 of the 
Griffith Codes. 
93 Ibid. Under s 7 of the Griffith Codes the categories of liability reflect those at common 
law. 'Para (a) describes a principal in the fIrst degree [person who does the act], paras (b) 
and (c) describe a principal in the second degree [person who does an act to aid anyone to 
commit the offence or aids anyone in committing the offence] and para (d) describes an 
accessory before the fact [counsels or procures].' 
94 Thambiah [1966] AC 37. 
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supplies materials or infonnation for use in committing and offence,95 
which includes the getaway driver or the lookout. However, as will be 
discussed in the next section, there is a single concept underlying the 
phrase 'aids, abets, counsels or procures' and s 12 is in need of 
modernisation. 
Clearly, s 12 Criminal Code (NT) and s 7 of the Griffith Codes follow the 
categories of liability at common law, and need to be seen in the context 
of the respective other sections discussed earlier which extend the 
criminal responsibility of an accessory. It is here contended that ss 8, 9, 
10 and 12 of the Criminal Code (NT) are to be preferred to ss 7, 8 and 9 
of the Griffith Codes. As Clough and Mulhem observe tinder the 
objective test 'it does not matter that the accused did not foresee the 
commission of the principal offence, so long as it was a probable 
consequence of the unlawful purpose' .96 However, such objectivity is 
qualified by a determination of probability from the position of the 
defendant. As Jacobs J observed in Stuart v The Queen97 '[tJhe probable 
consequence is the consequence which would have been apparent to an 
ordinary reasonable man in the position of the applicant, that is to say, in 
his state of knowledge'. As the High Court has stated, it is foresight not 
know ledffse or agreement that is the touchstone of extended common 
purpose. 
Kirby J is critical of the current test pointing out on the authority of 
Crabbe v The Queen99 that '[iJf a principal offender were to kill the 
victim, foreseeing only the possibility (rather than the probability) that his 
or her actions would cause death or grievous bodily harm, that person 
would not be gUilty of murder' .100 Kirby J goes on to observe that given a 
secondary offender could be found gUilty on the basis of foresight of a 
possibility of murder, such an outcome is anomalous and lacks 
symmetry .101 
This argument is met by a public policy justification well expressed by 
Simester and Sullivan. 'The law has a particular hostility to criminal 
groups ... they present a threat to public safety that ordinary criminal 
prohibitions, addressed to individual actors, do not entirely address 
95 Gray, above n 38, 155. 
96 Clough and Mulhem, above n 45, 11.68. 
97 (1974) 134 CLR 426,454 (emphasis added). 
98 Clayton v The Queen (2006) 81 AUR 439, 443 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, 
Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ); GiZZard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1, 38 (Hayne J). 
To add to the confusion on this point under s 8 Criminal Code (W A), Starke J in Brennan v 
The Queen (1936) 55 CLR 253,260-261 held that a probable consequence is 'that which a 
person of average competence and knowledge might be expected to foresee as likely to 
follow upon the particular act'. (Emphasis added). 
99 (1985) 156 CLR 464, 469-470. 
100 Clayton v The Queen (2006) 81 AUR 439,458. 
101 Ibid. 
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concerted wrong doing imports additional and special reasons why the 
law must intervene' .102 Similar sentiments were expressed by Lord 
Hutton in R v Powell103 where his Lordship supported the public policy 
argument based on deterrence: 
I recognise that as a matter of logic there is force in the argument 
advanced on behalf of the appellants, and that on one view it is anomalous 
that if foreseeability of death or really serious harm is not sufficient to 
constitute mens rea for murder in the party who actually carries out the 
killing, it is sufficient to constitute mens rea in a secondary party. But the 
rules of the common law are not based solely on logic but relate to 
practical concerns and, in relation to crimes committed in the course of 
joint enterprises, to the need to give effective protection to the public 
against criminals operating in gangs ... In my opinion there are practical 
considerations of weight and importance related to considerations of 
public policy which justify the principle ... and which prevail over 
considerations of strict logic.104 
The Criminal Code (NT) was drafted some 80 years after the Griffith 
Codes, and the language and structure of the later Code is better suited to 
the present day and the rise of organised crime. 105 More particularly, the 
use of a subjective rather than objective test for common purpose under s 
8, the use of rebuttable presumptions under sections 8, 9 and 10, and the 
addition of s 10 dealing with violence perpetrated by two or more 
persons, all combine to give the younger code a cutting edge to deal with 
I d . 106 gang re ate cnme. 
Kirby J, who dissented in Clayton, recognised that the objective test of a 
probable consequence contained in s 8 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) 
was 'frozen in time' .107 However, he argued that in re-expressing 
extended common purpose liability, the simplest approach would be for 
the High Court 'to replace the foresight required of the secondary 
offender under the present law [possible] by foresight of an outcome that 
was regarded as probable' .108 By contrast, this article, in company with 
102 Simester and Sullivan, above n 89, 226. 
103 [1999] 1 AC 1. 
104 Rv Powell [1999] 1 AC 1,25. 
105 Even before the Griffith Codes, writers like Sir Arthur Conan Doyle were inventing 
fictional criminal masterminds like Professor James Moriarty described by Sherlock 
Holmes as the 'Napoleon of Crime' . 
106 Bronitt and McSherry, above n 41. Both the Gibbs Committee and the MCCOC 
recommended the subjective approach. The Gibbs Committee 'recommended the adoption 
of the subjective test of foresight of possibility' - see above n 35, 503. 
107 Clayton v The Queen (2006) 81 AUR 439,457. 
108 lbid 463. Kirby J's preferred position, at 463-464, was that 'the judge would explain the 
need for the jury to be sure that the secondary offender either wanted the principal offender 
to act as he or she did, with the intention which he or she had, or knew that it was virtually 
certain that the principal offender would do so', citing J Smith, 'Criminal Liability of 
Accessories: Law and Law Reform' (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 453,465 (emphasis 
in original). This paper rejects such a position on public policy grounds as it represents the 
72 The University of Tasmania Law Review Vo130 No 1 2011 
the Gibbs Committee and the MCCOC, contends for the subjective test of 
foresight of possibility. 
The use of a subjective rather than an objective test sets the Criminal 
Code (NT) and the Criminal Code (Cth) apart from the Griffith Codes. 
This then leads, fIrst, onto a comparison with s 11.2 Criminal Code (Cth) 
now incorporated into Part llAA as s 43BG of the Criminal Code (NT), 
which Kirby J exampled as '[ w ]ithin Australia, piecemeal reforms by way 
of limited statutory enactments have been achieved' .109 Then second to 
whether the Northern Territory should follow the Commonwealth's 
example and insert a new s 43BGA to mirror s 11.2A 'Joint 
Commission' . 
ill THE NEW STATE OF THE LAW OF COMPLICITY AND 
COMMON PURPOSE IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY 
A Complicity and Common Purpose 
By contrast with the dual ss 8 and 12 in the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) 
dealt with in the previous section, s 11.2 of the Criminal Code 1995 
(Cth), which for 15 years stood alone and which has become s 43BG of 
the Criminal Code 1983 (NT),110 combines complicity with common 
purpose into the one section. Interestingly, s 11.2 has remained unaltered 
notwithstanding the insertion· of s 11.2A Joint Commission and the two 
sections are presumably either to work in tandem or to overlap. Under s 
11.2A(1), joint commission applies when a person and a least one other 
person enter into an agreement to commit an offence, and either an 
offence is committed in accordance with that agreement or an offence is 
committed in the course of carrying out the agreement. As Lanham et al 
greatest degree of difficulty for the Crown to prove secondary liability in extended 
common purpose crimes, and is consistent with the view of the majority of the High Court 
in Clayton v The Queen. 
109 Clayton v The Queen (2006) 81 AUR 439, 462. 
110 Section 43BG of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) does not include s 11.2(7) of the 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). Section 11.2(7) states: 'If the trier of fact is satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that a person either: (a) is gUilty of a particular offence otherwise than 
because of the operation of subsection (1); or (b) is guilty of that offence because of the 
operation of subsection (1), but is not able to determine which, the trier of fact may 
nonetheless find the person gUilty of that offence.' The absence of s 11.2(7) in s 43BG may 
partly explain why s 10 of the Criminal Code 1983 (NT), which covers death or serious 
harm caused in the course of violence of 2 or more persons, and is constructed to avoid 
each defendant being acquitted because of the Crown's inability to prove which defendant 
actually struck the final fatal blow, is not on the list of provisions of Part 1 in s 43AA(2) 
which do not apply in relation to Schedule 1 offences. However, the rebuttable 
presumption contained in s 10 has no reverse onus of proof counterpart in s 11.2(7) which 
permits a guilty verdict even if the trier of fact is unable to determine whether guilt was 
because of the operation of sub-s (1) or not. Subsection (1) states: 'A person who aids, 
abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence by another person is taken to 
have committed that offence and is punishable accordingly.' 
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point out, these 'Codesll1 limit the common purpose rule to cases where 
the wrong agreed upon is an offence and the indirect ~arty is reckless 
about the offence actually committed by the direct party'. 12 
The use of the words 'is taken to have committed' in s 43BG(I) below 
replicate the deeming language of s 12(1) of the Criminal Code 1983 
(NT), subject to proof of either of the fault elements (intention or 
reckless) in 43BG(3) and proof of the absence of withdrawal ('terminated 
involvement' and 'took all reasonable steps to prevent the commission of 
the offence') under s 43BG(5). However, while the common law in 
England allows an accomplice to be convicted of a more serious offence 
than the principal offender,113 'the Code [both Cth and NT] appears to 
preclude that possibility,114 as by virtue of s 43BG(1) below 'the 
accomplice is guilty of the same offence as the principal' .115 
Nevertheless, as Bronitt and McSherry point out while s 43BG(2)(b) 
'states that offences by another person must have been committed, there 
is no need for proof of conviction' 116 as per s 43BG(6). Thus, instead of 
being treated as an extension of criminal responsibility like inchoate 
offences, 'accessorial liability is a mode of participation in the 
perpetrator's offence ' (original emphasis). 117 
Subdivision 4 External factors 
43BG Complicity and common purpose 
(1) A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an 
offence by another person is taken to have committed that offence and is 
punishable accordingly. 
(2) For the person to be guilty: 
(a) the person's conduct must have in fact aided, abetted, counselled 
or procured the commission of the offence by the other person; 
and 
(b) the offence must have been committed by the other person. 
(3) For the person to be guilty, the person must have intended that: 
III Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 11.2(3)(b); Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 43BG(3)(b). See 
also Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 45 (2)(b )(ii). 
112 Lanham et ai, above n 35,503. It should be noted that the Lanham text (2006) pre-dates 
s 11.2A Joint Commission of the Criminal Code (Cth). 
113 Howe [1987] 2 WLR 568 [HL] overruling Richards [1974] QB 776. 
114 I Leader-Elliott for the Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department, The 
Commonwealth Criminal Code - A Guide for Practitioners (2002) 249 ('Guide for 
Practitioners '). 
ll5lbid. 'Section 11.2(1) [s 43BG(I) in the Criminal Code 1983 (NT)]: An accomplice in 
"an offence [committed] by another person is taken to have committed that offence" (italics 
for emphasis).' 
116 Bronitt and McSherry, above n 41, 343. 
1l7lbid. 
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(a) the person's conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the 
commission of any offence (including its fault elements) of the 
type the other person committed; or 
(b) the person's conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the 
commission of an offence and have been reckless about the 
commission of the offence (including its fault elements) that the 
other person in fact committed. 
(4) Subsection (3) has effect subject to subsection (7). 
(5) A person cannot be found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or 
procuring the commission of an offence if, before the offence was 
committed, the person: 
(a) terminated his or her involvement; and 
(b) took all reasonable steps to prevent the commission of the 
offence. 
(6) A person may be found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or 
procuring the commission of an offence even if the principal offender has 
not been prosecuted or has not been found guilty. 
(7) Any special liability provisions that apply to an offence apply also to 
the offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission 
of that offence. 
In R v Kaldor,118 a case involving the procurement of prohibited imports, 
Howie J in interpreting s 11.2 Criminal Code (Cth) stated that the 
'provision, in its terms, does not create an offence but merely states a way 
in which a person may commit an offence' 119 and that the section 'does 
no more than extend criminal liability for an offence contained in the 
Code' .120 Thus, a person is 'made criminally responsible for the offence 
committed by the principal offender,121 and the provision operates as an 
extension of principal offences.122 Therefore, any prosecution of the 
'accomplice' requires both proof that the offence was committed by the 
principal offender and proof of all the elements of the provision. 
Hayne J in GiZZard v The Queen explained the operation of the crucial 
fault elements contained in s 11.2(3) of the Criminal Code (Cth) and 
highlighted the centrality of foresight of a possibility to recklessness as 
follows: 
Section 11.2(3) of the Criminal Code (Cth) provides that a person is taken 
to have committed an offence committed by another if he or she aids, 
118 [2004] NSWCCA 425 2004/1832 (29 November 2004) (Dunford, Adams and Howie 
JJ). 
119 Ibid [77]. 
120 Ibid [79]. 
121 S Odgers, Principles of Federal Criminal Law (Thomson Reuters, 2007) 133. 
122 See note to s 11.6 Criminal Code (Cth). 
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abets, counsels or procures the commission of that offence and intended 
either that his or her conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the 
commission of that offence, or that 'his or her conduct would aid, abet, 
counsel or procure the commission of an offence and have been reckless 
about the commission of the offence (including its fault elements) that the 
other person in fact committed' (emphasis added). The South Australian 
law reform proposals to which reference has been made123 also provided 
for liability in cases where what was done went beyond what was agreed 
by reference to the concept of recklessness. In this context, foresight of 
the relevant possibility is central to the notion of recklessness. 124 
The GuideJor Practitioners states that in regards to the conduct element 
of complicity, the Criminal Code (Cth) and the common law 'employ a 
common conceptual vocabulary and case law in common law 
jurisdictions has continuing relevance when the conduct element of 
complicity under the Code is in issue' .125 Sub-sections 43BG(1) and (2) 
list four alternative physical elements: aids, abets, counsels or procures. 
Historically, to aid or to abet has referred to those physically present at 
the time the offence was committed, whilst to counsel or to procure has 
referred to persons who were absent.126 In Giorgianni v The Queen, 
Mason J having discussed this traditional distinction concluded that 'in 
substance, however, there appears to be no distinction between a principal 
in the second degree and an accessory before the fact beyond the question 
of presence' .127 
Sub-section 43BG(2)(a) Criminal Code (NT) requires that the conduct of 
the accomplice 'in fact' aided et aI, which has been taken to mean 
'manifest assent to actions in a manner promotes their 
performance' .128 The Guide for Practitioners states that it follows from a 
requirement for manifest assent that 'counsel and abetment cannot 
amount to complicity unless the principal offender was aware of the 
defendant's attempts to promote the criminal activities of the 
principal' .129 This is to be contrasted with criminal liability being incurred 
123 In Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1, 21 (in footnote 67) Kirby J cited and 
referred to the South Australian law reform proposals as follows: 'South Australia, 
Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia, The Substantive 
Criminal Law, 4th Report (1977), 300-309. The Committee proposed a redefinition of the 
common law doctrine by reference to the principle of recklessness. It recommended that an 
accomplice should be liable for a collateral offence if a substantial risk had been adverted 
to. The report was written before lohns (1980) and McAuliffe (1995). It has not been 
implemented. ' 
124 Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1, 38. 
125 Leader-Elliott, above n 114,249. 
126 Ferguson v Weaving [1951] 1 KB 814, 818-819. 
127 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473, 493. 
128 B Fisse, Howard's Criminal Law (Thomson Legal and Regulatory, 1990) 326. 
129 Leader-Elliott, above n 114,251. 
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where an accomplice aids the principal notwithstanding the principal 
being unaware of such assistance.130 
The better view is contained in the passage of the judgment of Cussen 
ACJ in Rv Russell131 where His Honour was discussing the compendious 
phrase 'aids, abets, counsels or procures', and was of the opinion that 
these words were all 'instances of one general idea, that the person 
charge~ ... is by his cond~c~ dOllJ£ something to bring a~out, or ren?ering 
more likely, such COl11Il11SSIon'. - Mason J adopted thIS observatIon as 
'descriptive of a single concept'133 and Cussen ACJ's formulation was 
more recently adapted to require that the accomplice 'was by his or her 
words or conduct doing something to bring about, or rendering more 
likely, through encouragement or assistance, its commission' .134 
The author respectfully agrees with Odgers that a similar approach should 
be taken in s 43BG Criminal Code (NT) (s 11.2 Criminal Code (Cth)) 
that the words 'aids, abets, counsels or procures ... should be considered 
as a compendious phrase descriptive of a single concept' .135 Adopting 
Cussen ACJ's objective test for conduct of 'render more likely', Odgers 
contends that even if the increased likelihood mi9ht be small, or there is 
no causal impact,136 or the principal is unaware13 of the existence of the 
accomplice, 'nonetheless, encouragement or assistance will be 
sufficient' .138 It is contended that such defmitional clarification should be 
included in the provision as notes to s 43BG(l) and (2) and s 11(2)(1) and 
(2) as below. 
43BG Complicity 
(1) A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an 
offence by another person is taken to have committed that offence 
and is punishable accordingly. 
130 Ibid citing Fisse, above n 128,326. 
13l [1933] VLR 59. 
132 Rv Russell [1933] VLR 59,67. 
133 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473,493. 
134 Rv Phan (2001) 123 A Crim R 30 [69] (Wood CJ at CL). 
135 Odgers, Principles of Federal Criminal Law, above n 121, 137. 
136 See also Leader-Elliott, above n 114, 251. 'Conduct will amount to aiding, abetting or 
counsel though it cannot be said to have caused the commission of the principal offence. 
To procure an offence, however, is to cause or bring it about.' (Emphasis in original) 
Odgers, Principles of Federal Criminal Law, see above n 121, 138, takes issue with the 
exception of 'to procure' contending that the phrase 'aid, abet, counsel or procure' is better 
viewed 'as descriptive of a single concept, which does not require a causal link between the 
conduct of the accomplice and the commission of the offence by PO [principal offender]'. 
137 The use of the words 'in fact' in s 43BG(2)(a) distinguishes actual encouragement from 
token encouragement as per Larkins v Police [1987] 2 NZLR 282, 288-290. Actual 
assistance of which the principal is unaware will fall within the 'in fact' requirement 
whereas actual encouragement unknown to the principal will not. 
138 Odgers, Principles of Federal Criminal Law, above n 121, 137. 
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Note: aids, abets, counsels or procures is to be treated as a single 
compendious concept which does not require a causal link between the 
conduct of the person who aids et al and the conduct of another person 
who commits the offence. 
(2) For the person to be guilty: 
(a) the person's conduct must have in fact aided, abetted, counselled 
or procured the commission of the offence by the other person; 
and 
(b) the offence must have been committed by the other person. 
Note: For the purposes of this section, a person's conduct is to be 
determined objectively as to whether the person rendered more likely the 
commission of the offence by the other person. 
As the Guide for Practitioners makes clear 'since accomplice liability is 
derivative rather than direct, the ~rosecution must prove commission of 
the offence by the other person,.13 Whilst the physical and fault elements 
must be proved under ss 43BG(2) and (3), the prosecution or conviction 
of the principal offender is not a prerequisite for the conviction of the 
accomplice under s 43BG(6). Furthermore, as s 43BG(1) uses the phrase 
'taken to have committed' it is unnecessary to separately identify a 
party's role as either principal or accomplice. Neither does the provision 
'draw a distinction between accomplices who are present at the scene of 
the commission of the offence and accomplices who are not' .140 Thus, if 
the Crown can prove the elements of s 43BG (s 11.2), the exact role a 
party played or whether or not present at the time is irrelevant to securing . 
a conviction as an accomplice. This in turn gives the section some 
robustness although only for derivative liability. However, as will be 
discussed later, it is a different story for primary liability. 
The Guide for Practitioners makes it quite clear that 'the common law 
doctrine of 'acting in concert' has no counterpart in the Code (Cth), , 141 
going on to state that the essence of the doctrine is that 'liability is taken 
to be direct rather than derivative,142 such that all the participants in a 
joint enterprise 'are taken to be principal offenders' .143 It follows from the 
. derivative nature of accomplice liability under s 43 BG (s 11.2) that, as 
acting in concert is a form of direct criminal liability, joint criminal 
enterprise 'is incompatible with the structure of the Code and has no 
place in Commonwealth jurisprudence' .144 Such a statement no longer 
holds true following the insertion of s 11.2A Joint Commission. 
139 Leader-Elliott, above 114,251. 
140 Odgers, Principles of Federal Criminal Law, above n 121, 138. 
141 Leader-Elliott, above n 114,261. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid 263. 
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When s 11.2 was the sole section dealing with complicity and common 
purpose it stood in sharp contrast to s 8( 1) Criminal Code (NT), and goes 
to the heart of the difference between s 8(1) and s 43BG (s 11.2). The 
latter section combines complicity and common purpose whilst the 
former covers common purpose only and is supplemented by s 12 above 
which covers abettors and accessories before the fact (complicity). The 
absence of a concept of joint criminal enterprise under the original 
Criminal Code (Cth) resulted in the Commonwealth using the offence of 
conspiracl (s 11.5) in cases where a joint criminal enterprise clearly 
existed. 14 
In this context, it is interesting that as Bronitt and McSherry point out the 
MCCOC 'favoured a separate Erovision, distinct from aiding and abetting 
relating to common purpose'. 46 However, by this the MCCOC meant s 
11.2(3)(b) as opposed to s 11.2(3)(a) which covers complicity, and not a 
separate section as per the other Codes. The learned authors suggest that s 
11.2 Criminal Code (Cth) 'envisaged that common purpose would be 
viewed, consistent with the approach in England, as merely one way of 
aiding and abetting an offence'. 147 The authors also observe that since s 
11.2(3)(b) Criminal Code (Cth) , which is equivalent to s 43BG(3)(b) 
Criminal Code (NT), 'departs from Giorgiannl48 by allowing 
recklessness as an alternative fault standard, it was considered 
unnecess~ to articulate expressly a distinct fault element for common 
purpose' .14 
Sub-sections 11.2(3)(a) and (b) were considered in R v Choi (Pong Su) 
(No 12/50 in the context of whether the fault element of recklessness 
applied to both sub-sections. Kellam J held that recklessness only applied 
to s 11.2(3)(b) dealing with common purpose, in contradistinction to s 
11.2(3)(a) dealing with complicity for which the fault element was 
intention. lSl To fmd otherwise would render redundant the specification 
of 'recklessness' in s 11.2(3)(b).IS2 In Rv Choi, Kellam J was concerned 
only with s 11.2(3)(a) and concluded that the Crown must prove: 
145 See Justice Howie, 'Interpretation of the Criminal Code (Cth)' (Paper Presented at 
Public Defenders Criminal Law Conference, Sydney, 27 and 28 March 2010) [23]. 
146 Bronitt and McSherry, above n 41, 380, citing the Model Criminal Code Officers 
Committee, General Principles ojCriminal Responsibility, Final Report (1992),88. 
147 Bronitt and McSherry, above n 41,380. 
148 Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473, 505 (Wilson, Dawson and Deane JJ): 
'Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence requires the 
intentional assistance or encouragement of the doing of those things which go to make up 
the offence.' 
149 Bronitt and McSherry, above n 41, 380. 
150 [2005] VSC 32 (21 February 2005). 
151 R V Choi (Pong Su) (No 12) [2005] VSC 32 (21 February 2005) [44]. 
152 !bid [45]. 
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(a) That the conduct of reach or any of the accused persons in fact aided, 
abetted, counselled or procured the commission of the offence which was 
committed by the other person (s 11.2(2)(a)). 
(b) That the offence which was so aided, et cetera, was committed by the 
other person. 
(c) That the accused person intended that his conduct would aid, abet, 
counsel or procure the commission of any offence (including its fault 
elements) of the type the other person committed (s 11.2(3)(a)). In this 
case the type of offence is the offence of importing prohibited imports to 
which s.233B(1)(b) of the Customs Act applies. l53 
In Ansari v The Queen,154 Howie J (with whom Simpson and Hislop JJ 
agreed), in the leading judgment for the Court of Criminal Appeal, 
approved Kel1am J's above interpretation of s 11.2 of the Criminal Code 
(Cth). 
These provisions accord with the Common Law principles as to aiding 
and abetting. Because the accused must have intended to assist the 
commission of the offence by the principal, the accused must have known 
of all the facts that would make the conduct that he was assisting a 
criminal offence. Recklessness as to the existence of facts is not 
sufficient: R v Choi (Pong Su) (Ruling No 12) [2005] VSC 32. This 
reading of s 11.2 is both consistent with the Common Law and would be 
consistent with the approach to conspiracy under the Code that I favour. 155 
Howie J's reference above to conspiracy reflected the facts in Ansari and 
the interpretation of s 11.5(2)(b) of the Criminal Code (Cth) that the 
accused and at least one other person 'have intended that an offence 
would be committed pursuant to the agreement'. In R v LK,156 the High 
Court held that a person cannot be found guilty of conspiracy under s 
11.5 of the Criminal Code (Cth) unless the fault element of knowledge 
can be proven. Thus, being reckless as to the fact that the money was 
proceeds of crime was insufficient. 
It was incumbent on the prosecution to prove that LK and RK 
intentionally entered an agreement to commit the offence that it averred 
was the subject of the conspiracy. This required proof that each meant to 
enter into an agreement to commit that offence (s 5(2)(1)). As a matter of 
ordinary English it may be thought that a person does not agree to commit 
an offence without knowledge of, or belief in, the existence of the facts 
that make the conduct that is the subject of the agreement an offence.157 
153lbid [49] (original emphasis). 
154 A Ansari v R, H Ansari v R [2007] NSWCCA 204 (14 August 2007). 
155 Ibid [80]. 
156 Rv LK; Rv RK [2010] RCA 17 (26 May 2010). 
157lbid [117]. 
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Whilst intention is too restrictive for complicity and the broader fault base 
of recklessness for common purpose is an improvement,158 there remains 
the issue of whether a single section 159 purportedly covering both 
complicity and common purpose, is the most appropriate statutory 
approach to participation in crime. 
It is significant that the MCCOC 'had echoed concerns about the width of 
the existing common purpose rule' 160 originally supporting the argument 
that it would be unjust to allow recklessness for complicity and to allow 
common purpose. The MCCOC explained its reasoning that 'with the 
abolition of recklessness generally from complicity [a reference to 
intention as the fault element in s 43BG(3)(a)], it was decided to restore 
common pumose in a modified form based on the general test of 
recklessness1 1 used in the Code' .162 It is significant that this defInition of 
recklessness moves beyond mere awareness of possibility, instead 
requiring that the awareness of risk must be substantial and unjustifiable. 
This outcome dilutes the common law position. The limitations of this 
'modified form' of common purpose are magnified by the absence of 
overlapping sections, at least until the arrival of s 11.2A. This section was 
enacted to enable the attribution of criminal responsibility in divisible 
offences and to supplement complicity based on aiding et aI, by criminal 
liability based on an agreement to commit an offence, such as those to be 
found in both the original Criminal Code (NT) and the Griffith Codes. 
One can only agree with Odgers who has said that 'the use of the term 
'common purpose' in this context is unhelpful and potentially 
misleading' .163 The implication is that there is a shared purpose between 
the principal offender and the accomplice when no such requirement 
exists. There are four elements for an offence to be committed under s 
43BG(3)(b): (i) the accomplice aided et al, in fact, the commission of the 
offence by the principal; (ii) that offence was committed by the principal; 
158 The contrary view taken by the High Court in Giorgianni in rejecting recklessness and 
insisting on actual knowledge and by supporters such as Bronitt, 'Defending Giorgianni-
Part One', above n 4, 242 is now effectively redundant. As Bronitt himself has 
acknowledged in his own article: 'Giorgianni has had few supporters in Australia. 
Described as unsound both in principle and policy, the decision has prompted calls for its 
reversal by statute' (243, citing Fisse, above n 128, 336). ill a line of cases post McAulifje, 
the High Court has adopted recklessness in the form of foresight of a possibility as the 
touchstone of accessorialliability which finds expression in s 11.2 Criminal Code (Cth). 
159 Albeit now supplemented by s 11.2A 'Joint Commission' to remedy the deficiency that 
joint criminal enterprise was incompatible with the structure of the Criminal Code (Cth) as 
originally conceived by the MCCOC. 
160 MCCOC, above n 20,91. 
161 For example, under s 43AK(1): 'a person is reckless in relation to a result if (a) the 
person is aware of a substantial risk that the result will happen; and (b) having regard to the 
circumstances known to the person, it is unjustifiable to take the risk. ' 
162 MCCOC, above n 20, 91. 
163 Odgers, Principles of Federal Criminal Law, above n 121, 145. 
In Search of a Model Code Provision for Complicity and Common Purpose 81 
(iii) the accomplice intended his or her conduct would aid et al the 
commission of an offence; and (iv) the accomplice was reckless about the 
commission of the offence that the principal committed. 164 
The limitations of s 43BG(3)(b) are well illustrated by the infamous case 
of Os land v The Queen.165 In that case, Heather Osland and her son David 
Albion jointly planned and executed the murder of Frank Osland, 
although David Albion actually bashed in his stepfather's head with an 
iron pipe after his mother had sedated him and held him down. Heather 
Osland was convicted of murder while David Albion was acquitted. The 
Crown ran a case of straightforward joint criminal enterprise and 
therefore Heather's liability was primary and not derivative. According to 
the Guide for Practitioners joint criminal enterprise is incompatible with 
the structure of the Criminal Code (Cth) and so such an approach would 
not be available under s 43BG(3)(b). If the Crown had run the case as one 
of principal and accessory, which appears to be the only option under s 
43BG(3)(b), then Heather's liability would have been derivative. It 
follows that with David's acquittal 'no principal offence had been 
committed166 and therefore Heather could not be liable as an 
accessory' .167 
Understandably, the correctness of this argument may be questioned 
given the presence of s 43BG(6) above which allows a person to be found 
guilty as an accessory 'even if the principal offender has not been 
prosecuted or has been found not guilty'. However, the Crown must 
prove that the offence was committed by someone, as s 43BG(2)(b) 
requires 'the offence must have been committed by the other person'. By 
contrast, if Heather Osland had been tried under s 8 of the Criminal Code 
1983 (NT), she would have faced a rebuttable presumption of having 
aided or procured the perpetrator( s) to commit the offence unless she was 
able to prove on the balance of probabilities she did not foresee the 
commission of that offence as a possible consequence. 
It is here contended that such an outcome under s 43BG(3)(b), if Heather 
Osland had been tried as an accessory rather than as a joint perpetrator, is 
. unsatisfactory and requires more than the amendment of the insertion of 
'Joint Commission' under 11.2A. At common law, joint criminal 
164 Ibid. 
165 (1998) 197 CLR 316. 
166 See s 43BG(2)(b) which states that 'the offence must have been committed by the other 
Eerson' . 
67 Clough and Mulhern, above n 45, 11.61, citing Osland v R (1998) 197 CLR 316, 324 
(Gaudron and Gummow JJ). 'An accessory cannot be convicted unless the jury is satisfied 
that the principal offence was committed (Surujpaul v The Queen [1958] WLR 1050, 
1053). Thus, if two people are tried together as principal and accessory, and the evidence 
as to the commission of the crime is the same against both, acquittal of the person charged 
as principal is inconsistent with the conviction of the other.' 
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enterprise (or acting in concert) applies where both parties share a 
common plan and are present during the commission of the offence, and 
are either assisting or encouraging one another. Criminal liability for both 
parties is primary and is based on some direct 'causal' link between the 
parties. By contrast, under extended common purpose liability is 
secondary, where members of the group mayor may not be present 
during the commission of the crime, and the crime was neither agreed nor 
authorised, but merely foreseen. There is no direct causal connection (as 
opposed to joint criminal enterprise) which is the key distinction between 
primary and derivative or secondary liability. The matter is complicated 
where acting in concert Goint commission) can arise on the same facts as 
common purpose (as to the foundational crime), although the basis for 
extended liability is derivative not primary. 
It would appear that s 11.2A 'Joint Commission' avoids, or is silent on, 
the above common law requirements of the presence of the joint 
offenders at the commission of the offence, assisting or encouraging each 
other at the time of the offence, and a direct 'causal' link between the 
parties, notwithstanding the use of 'joint offence' in s 11.2A which is not 
defmed. As has been discussed, under the Criminal Code (Cth), 'common 
purpose' extends the liability of an accomplice by virtue of s 11.2(3)(b), 
such that an accomplice is guilty of an unplanned offence committed by a 
principal where the accomplice was 'reckless about the commission of 
the offence' . An identical approach is taken in s 11.2A(3), which purports 
to extend the liability of a joint offender A for an unplanned offence 
committed by joint offender B, if joint offender A 'is reckless about the 
commission of an offence (the joint offence),. But, if the common law 
rules for joint commission do not apply to s 11.2A, how then can criminal 
responsibility be described as primary and how does it differ from the 
derivative responsibility of common purpose? 
The Law Commission for England and Wales, recognising the difficulties 
flowing from derivative liability, recommended the introduction of new 
inchoate offences dealing with intending to encourage or assist in the 
commission of an offence (or believing that the offence will be 
committed), whether or not the principal offence was committed.168 Thus, 
the Law Commission's approach was to develop non-derivative offences. 
These recommendations were adopted in part in the Serious Crime Act 
2007 (UK), referred to earlier in the discussion on the reverse onus of 
proof. 
Ormerod and Fortson have suggested Part 2 of the Act involves a 
'fundamental shift to looking at the harm threatened instead of the harm 
168 Law Refonn Commission for England and Wales, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and 
Encouraging Crime, Law Commission Report No 300 (2006), 8 and 49. See also Bronitt 
and McSherry, above n 41,421. 
In Search of a Model Code Provision for Complicity and Common Purpose 83 
caused' .169 As to the effect of Part 2, Bronitt and McSherry state that the 
provisions 'confer a wide discretion on prosecutors who no longer have to 
prove which offence the defendant has committed if it can be proven that 
the defendant "must have committed the inchoate offence or the 
anticipated offence'" .170 The learned authors go on to suggest that 'the 
enactment of non-derivative statutory offences does not resolve the 
conceptual strains clearly apparent in the present framework of 
complicity' .171 Be that as it may, the derivative foundations of liability are 
too entrenched to be abandoned. This article contends that 'the conceptual 
strains' are minimised under ss 8 to 10 of the Criminal Code (NT). 
The introduction of s 11.2A to the Criminal Code (Cth) was 'targeted at 
offenders who commit crimes in organised groups, and hence the 
relevance to serious and organised crime ... and targets members of 
organised groups who divide criminal activity between them' .172 As 
Biddington noted the introduction of s 11.2A 'has largely gone unnoticed 
... and will put the common law principle of joint criminal enterprise into 
the legislative framework' .173 This statement would appear to be arguable 
as there is nothing in s 11.2A that requires the parties to be present during 
the commission of the offence, which is the essence of primary liability 
for joint commission. 
Another significant difficulty with s 11.2A is that it mirrors the form of 
its sister section 11.2 in that recklessness is the fault element in s 
11.2A(3) for an offence committed in the course of carrying out the 
agreement. Recklessness is the default fault element for a physical 
element that consists of a circumstance or a result,174 and is the fault 
element that underpins the Criminal Code (Cth). As mentioned above, it 
is contended that the Criminal Code (Cth)' s defInition of recklessness 
that the awareness of the risk must be substantial and unjustifIable, rather 
than the common law's mere awareness of a possibility, does not 
sufficiently meet the mischief presented by complicity, common purpose 
and joint commission. Fundamentally, s 11.2A has the hallmark of a 
shoehomed section to deal with a glaring omission, which overlooked the 
opportunity to take common purpose out of s 11.2(3), given there is no 
rational basis for the separation of s 11.2(3)(b) and s 11.2A on the 
grounds of a distinction between secondary and primary liability. 
169 D Ormerod and R Fortson, 'Serious Crime Act 2007: The Part 2 Offences' (2009) 
Criminal Law Review 389,393. 
170 Bronitt and McSherry, above n 41,422, quoting from Serious Crime Act 2007 (UK) s 
56(1)(a). 
171 Bronitt and McSherry, above n 41, 433. 
172 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 24 June 2009, 6967 
(Robert McClelland, Attorney-General). 
173 M Biddington, Parliament of Australia, Bills Digest, Crimes Legislation Amendment 
(Serious and Organised Crime) Bill 2009, no 31 (16 September 2009) 2l. 
174 See s 5.6(2) Criminal Code (Cth). 
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The introduction of s 11.2A is a minimum provision as it fills an obvious 
deficiency in the original s 11.2. The defmition of agreement in s 11.2(5), 
which encompasses a non-verbal understanding, is to be applauded as it 
imports McAuliffe. 175 However, s 11.2A(2) provides that an offence is 
committed in accordance with the agreement only where the offence 
actually committed is an offence of the same type as the offence in the 
original agreement. This article contends that such a limitation is 
unnecessarily restrictive. The simplicity and reach of s 8(2) Criminal 
Code (NT) is plain from the defmition of common intention as 'to 
prosecute an unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another when they 
agree to engage in or concur in engaging in any conduct that, if engaged 
in would involve them or some or one of them in the commission of an 
offence' (emphasis added). 
The most appropriate statutory approach to deal with the limitations of s 
43BG (s 11.2) is to rename s 43BG to cover complicity only by removing 
s 43BG(3)(b) completely, and therefore to deal with common purpose 
separately in the manner adopted by the existing ss 8, 9 and 10 of Part I 
Criminal Code (NT). The test of recklessness in s 43BG(3)(b) sits 
between the probability test in the Griffith Codes and the possibility test 
in the Criminal Code (NT) as recklessness combines the subjective intent 
of the secondary participant and the objective situation.176 It is contended 
that the rebuttable presumptions in sections 8 to 10 Criminal Code (NT) 
are superior to a parallel offence of joint commission in s 11.2A. 
The Law Reform Commission of New South Wales usefully ranked the 
available tests of liability for secondary participants under extended 
common purpose 'in order of the degree of difficulty for a prosecution to 
establish secondary liability' .177 The tests identified are: intention to 
commit homicide; intention to cause really serious bodily harm coupled 
with an awareness of the risk of homicide; virtual certainty to commit 
homicide; probability of homicide (Queensland, Tasmania and Western 
Australia); recklessness as to homicide (Commonwealth, Australian 
Capital Territory, and Northern Territory); and possibility of homicide 
(common law jurisdictions of New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia). 
The argument being made here is that the tests of intention (the top step 
on the staircase of fault liability) and virtual certainty (which effectively 
requires the recklessness to be so extreme as to virtually merge into 
intention) above are too lenient towards secondary participants under 
175 McAuliffe and McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108. 
176 Law Refonn Commission of New South Wales, above n 3, 6.13. See also s 43 AK(1) 
above n 161, 'recklessness' involves an awareness of a substantial risk by the secondary 
participant and a lack of justification in taking that risk. 
177 Law Refonn Commission of New South Wales, above n 3,6.13. 
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extended common pUl-pose. The objective probability test is rejected as 
outmoded, and recklessness is considered too weak because the defmition 
of recklessness straddles the probability and possibility tests. The 
preferred test out of the Commission's list above, because it presents the 
least degree of difficulty to the Crown, is the common law test of 
possibility of homicide as per McAuliffe, GiZZard and Clayton, which is 
based 'on the subjective state of mind of the secondary participant and 
whether he or she thought that the additional crime was "possible" in the 
circumstances as he or she knew them' . 178 
However, whilst the Commission mentioned s 43BG of the Criminal 
Code (NT), it overlooked sections 8 to 10 of the Criminal Code (NT). 
Given the reverse onus of proof in sections 8 to 10, on the above ranking 
of the available tests for secondary liability, these original sections would 
be at the bottom of the degree of difficulty for the prosecution to establish 
secondary liability. In other words, ss 8 to 10 rank below the common law 
test of the possibility of homicide. This article contends that given the 
public policy perspective that underpins the reverse onus of proof in the 
face of the rise of organised crime and the prevalence of gang violence, 
such a ranking qualifies ss 8 to 10 as the model code provisions for 
common purpose and joint enterprise. The superadded burden on the 
defence is specifically designed to be asymmetrical and to tilt the scales 
in favour of the Crown179 because of the need to effectively protect 'the 
public against criminals operating in gangs' 180 and the pack mentality. 181 
B Withdrawal 
In an earlier part of this article dealing with s 8(2) Criminal Code (WA) it 
was stated that a fuller discussion of withdrawal would be undertaken 
during a later examination of s 43BG(5) Criminal Code (NT) which, like 
s 8(2) Criminal Code (W A), also adopts the taking reasonable steps 
approach as the test for withdrawal. In discussing s 11.2(4), the 
equivalent section in the Criminal Code (Cth) , Bronitt and McSherry 
observe that 'the defence leaves open how termination must occur, 
particularly in relation to the other parties, and what are reasonable steps 
to prevent the commission of the offence' .182 The unsatisfactory 
implication is that in the absence of defmitions or clarification, a judge 
178 Ibid. 
179 Cf Clayton v The Queen (2006) 81 AUR 439, 457-458 (Kirby J). 
180 Rv Powell [1999] 1 AC 1,25 (Lord Hutton). 
181 See, for example, a newspaper piece on street violence by J Silvester, 'Pack Mentality' , 
The Age (Melbourne) 17 July 2009. 
182 Bronitt and McSherry, above n 41,357. 
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will perforce have to rely on the common law or judicial interpretation of 
s 8(2) Criminal Code (VV A).183 
It seems clear that the onus of disproving tennination and lack of taking 
all reasonable s~s to withdraw rests with the prosecution but that an 
evidential onus 1 needs to be satisfied by the defendant.185 There is 
authority for the proposition that the accessory's withdrawal must be 
communicated to the principal offender186 and s 8 (2)(b ) Criminal Code 
(WA) goes further in requiring communication with 'each other person' 
who was part of the common intention. The well known passage from the 
judgment of Sloan JA in R v Whitehouse187 is apposite where His Honour 
defmes 'timely communication' as serving 'unequivocal notice' that the 
other party proceeds without further aid and assistance from the person 
who is withdrawing. 
On the question of taking reasonable steps, there is a conflict between the 
interpretation that it is sufficient to have taken reasonable steps to undo 
previous participation, or whether a more stringent interpretation is 
required 'that the accused eliminate his or her conduct as a cause of the 
ultimate offence' .188 In Queensland, where the Criminal Code makes no 
provision for timely withdrawal, the courts have apRlied the former test189 
which is mirrored in s 8(2)(c) Criminal Code (VVA).190 
Viewed from a public policy perspective, a decision as to which of the 
above two interpretations is to be preferred depends on the rationale for 
the defence.191 Is the basis of the defence the provision of an 'escape 
route' for a potential accessory to successfully extricate himself or herself 
from the criminal enterprise, which serves the dual function of raising the 
probability of withdrawal and lessening the risk of the principal offence 
occurring? Or is the eSsence of the defence that withdrawal is prima facie 
evidence of lack of fault? 
The former rationale or crime prevention argument would run along the 
lines that in organised crime groups, alerting the police, without 
183 See Bank of England v Vagliano Brothers [1891] AC 107, 145 (Lord Herschell) where 
it was stated that resort may be had to the previous state of the law where a provision is of 
doubtful import or had previously acquired a technical meaning. 
184 An evidential onus is defined as 'a reasonable possibility' under s 43BT Criminal Code 
(NT). 
185 R v Menitti [1985] 1 Qd R 520,530 (Thomas J). 
186 White v Ridley (1978) 140 CLR 342, 350-351 (Gibbs J). 
187 (1941) 1 WWR 112, 115-116. 
188 Kenny, above n 66, [9.56]. 
189 White v Ridley (1978) 140 CLR 342, 350 (Gibbs J); Rv Menitti [1985] 1 Qd R 520, 530 
(Thomas J). 
190 See Seiffert and Stupar (1999) 104 A Crim R 238, 254-259; Willis (2001) 25 WAR 217, 
243. 
191 K J M Smith, 'Withdrawal in Complicity: A Restatement of Principles' (2001) Criminal 
Law Review 769. 
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communicating with the group, may be the only reasonable method for a 
member to withdraw safely. Thus, taking reasonable steps would not 
necessarily comply with the common law test of giving unequivocal 
notice of complete withdrawal to the principal offender(s). The latter 
rationale requires the effective neutralisation of 'the assistance or 
encouragement offered to the perpetrator before the commission of the 
offence [which] means that the accessory's conduct had no causative 
influence on the subsequent . criminal conduct of the principal 
offender' .192 ( 
The meaning of reasonable steps was discussed by Hammond J in R v 
Pink: 
[T]he withdrawal may only be effected by taking all reasonable steps to 
undo the effect of the party's previous actions.193 As with any test of 
'reasonableness', it is impossible to divorce that consideration from the 
facts of a given case. The accused's actions may have been so overt and 
influential that positive ste~s must be taken by him to intercede, and 
prevent the crime occurring. 94 
In light of withdrawal being decided on the facts of any given case, it is 
here contended that for consistency the appropriate basis for the rationale 
underpinning of the defence of withdrawal is evidence that the fault 
element was not fulfilled, and that the accessory had no causative role in 
the subsequent offence. There is no apparent reason in principle not to 
prefer the application of the stricter common law tests (unequivocal 
notice of withdrawal to the principal offenders), and that any evidence of 
ineffective withdrawal should go to mitigation in sentencing.195 
However, it is recognised that such a strict test, whilst meeting the public 
policy objective of undoing criminal fault by requiring timely 
unequivocal notice of withdrawal, would also, at the same time, leave 
little scope for the operation of the other public policy objective of 
encouraging people involved to reveal a future criminal act in sufficient 
time for the authorities to take the necessary action to prevent a major 
crime. The latter public policy of crime prevention has merit. Adopting 
such a modified common law approach, s 43BG(5) Criminal Code (NT) 
and both s 11.2(4) and s 11.2A(6) Criminal Code (Cth) should be 
rewritten as follows: 
(5) A person cannot be found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or 
procuring the commission of an offence if, before the offence was 
committed, the person: 
192 Bronitt and McSherry, above n 41,355. 
193 Rv Menniti [1985] 1 Qd R 520. 
194 [2001] 2 NZLR 860 [22]. 
195 Rv Lew; R v Ng [2003] NSWSC 781 70238/02 (20 August 2003) (Adams J). 
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(a) countermanded his or her involvement by a timely 
communication of the intention to abandon the commission of 
the offence to each other person with whom the common 
intention to commit the offence was formed in terms that serve 
unequivocal notice to each other person that all aid and 
assistance is withdrawn unless there is cogent evidence that such 
communication of withdrawal would result in death or serious 
harm; and 
(b) took all reasonable steps to eliminate his or her conduct as a 
cause of the commission of the offence, which, depending on the 
circumstances, may involve taking steps to prevent the 
commission of the offence by warning the victim or the 
police. 196 
Note: For the purpose of this section, taking 'all reasonable steps' 
includes revealing a future criminal act in sufficient time for the police to 
take preventative action. 
Thus, to avoid the strictures of the common law, there would need to be 
both cogent evidence that withdrawal would expose the person to the 
likelihood of suffering death or serious harm, and the taking of all 
reasonable steps to either warn the victim or revealing the future criminal 
act in sufficient time for the police to take preventative action. 
Although conceptually the issue of withdrawal is different from the issues 
surrounding complicity and common purpose, it has been dealt with here 
for two reasons. First, withdrawal is a significant matter and has been 
specifically covered in ss 8(2) Criminal Code 1902 rw A), s 11.2(4) 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) , and s 43BG(5) Criminal Code 1983 (NT). 
Secondly, there needs to be consistency between the respective sub-
sections. Hence, as the public policy justification for adopting a 
subjective test and a reversal of the onus of proof for complicity and 
common purpose is a particular hostility to gang violence and organised 
crime, so too does the public policy weighting for withdrawal lean 
towards the stringent common law test of unequivocal timely withdrawal 
subject to the provisos above relating to resulting harm and time for 
preventative action. 
IV CONCLUSION 
As the title indicates, this article has sought to arrive at a model code 
provision for complicity and common purpose in Australia. It has been 
contended that the subjective approach and rebuttable presumptions 
contained in ss 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the original Criminal Code 1983 (NT) 
are preferable to the objective approach adopted by the Griffith Codes of 
Queensland and Westem Australia in the equivalent ss 7, 8, and 9. It has 
196 See Becerra and Cooper (1976) 62 er App R 212. 
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been further contended that s 11.2 Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) was less 
than satisfactory because by combining complicity and common purpose 
into the one section, the reach of common purpose was unnecessarily 
restricted. Even with the belated insertion of s 11.2A 'Joint Commission', 
the Criminal Code (Cth) provisions remain restricted because of the 
defmition of 'recklessness'. In addition, the treatment of withdrawal is 
considered to be too weak and that stricter common law principles should 
be specifically incorporated as per the revised s 43BG(5) above, whilst 
still allowing some scope for an 'escape route'. 
The revised s 43BG and s 11 (2) should be renamed 'Complicity' by 
removing s 43BG(3)(b) from the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) and s 
11.2(3)(b) from the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). This argument had merit 
when s 11.2 stood alone but has been strengthened, at least for the 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), with the arrival of s 11.2A. It has been argued 
that the better approach for the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) is to deal with 
common purpose separately in the manner adopted by the existing 
sections 8, 9 and 10 of Part I Criminal Code (NT) rather than import s 
11.2A. These sections should be entitled presumptions and inserted into 
Part IIAA as s 43BGA (1), (2) and (3). As detailed earlier in this article, 
there should also be notes appended to s 43BG(1) and (2) clarifying the 
meaning of the phrase 'aids, abets, counsels or procures' and the adoption 
of an objective test for a person's conduct of 'render more likely' the 
commission of the offence by the other person. 
In this search for a model code provision for complicity and common 
purpose, it is to be hoped that the suggested redrafted provisions, which 
are justified on public policy grounds and designed to present the lowest 
degree of difficulty to the Crown to establish secondary liability, may 
also prove to be helpful as a template for other Code jurisdictions in 
Australia. It is contended that these provisions will go some way to 
addressing the need to assist judges to more clearly explain the law of 
complicity to juries in place of the present 'potentially confusing' state of 
secondary liability. 197 
197 Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1, 20 (Kirby J); Clayton v The Queen (2006) 81 
AUR 439,460 (Kirby J). See also Gray, 'I Didn't Know, 1 Wasn't There', above n 4, 210; 
Justice Geoff Eames, 'Tackling the Complexity of Criminal Trial Directions: What Role 
for Appellate Courts?' (2007) 29 Australian Bar Review 161. 
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